WHY BRITAIN SHOULD STOP DEPLOYING TRIDENT
A critical opportunity to strengthen international resolve on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was missed at the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This is particularly regrettable... the Treaty is a cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We cannot be complacent about the challenges it faces.

Statement by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw on July 26, 2005, together with the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, and South Africa
A GLOBALLY DESTABILISING FIRST-STRIKE WEAPON – NOT A DETERRENT

Trident is a first strike weapon built to assure US global dominance...

The UK government’s presentation of Trident as a deterrent is misleading. The Carter and Reagan administrations believed that the goal of continued US world leadership necessitated that America regain the massive strategic advantage it had enjoyed over the Soviet Union in the 1960s. This led them to develop land-based MX and sea-based Trident missile systems which would be able to launch a surprise attack to destroy Soviet missile silos before the missiles in them could be fired.

... and US Navy prestige

Trident was also the product of inter-service rivalry. The US Navy had championed deterrence doctrine against the US Airforce’s advocacy of first strike doctrine. This fitted its Polaris submarine-based nuclear missile system which was incapable of first strike accuracy. In the late 1970s the US Navy realised that its development of more accurate submarine-based missiles meant that it could now challenge the Airforce on its own ground by embracing the first strike mission and developing the Trident C4 missile and then the more capable Trident D5 missile.

A weapon too far

Inter-service rivalry and the desire to re-establish nuclear superiority at a time when the Soviet Union was seen as rapidly developing its own nuclear capabilities, produced a weapon with truly extraordinary accuracy, speed of strike, destructive power, multiple targeting capability, immunity from attack, range and global reach:

• **Accuracy:** the Trident D5 missile can hit a 100-metre-wide target 50% of the time.
• **Strike speed:** because submarines can sail closer to their targets, Trident II missiles can reach their targets in 10–15 minutes as compared to the 30 minutes of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.
• **Destructive power:** when a US Trident submarine puts to sea, depending on the mix of warheads carried, it can deliver the explosive equivalent of between 1,280 and 6,080 Hiroshima bombs. The 2,016 warheads assigned to the US Trident fleet represent about 48% of the USA’s entire operational strategic weapons stockpile.
• **Targeting:** the Trident D5 missile can carry up to 14 independently targetable warheads.
• **Range:** the D5 missile has a range of 7,000km, or 11,000km with a reduced number of warheads. This means that a Trident submarine patrolling in the Atlantic can hit targets across the Middle East and all of Russia and China.

... and provides incentives for states across the globe to upgrade their nuclear arsenals (Russia and China) or to acquire the atomic bomb (Iran and North Korea)

The disposition of the US and UK Trident fleets, and the extraordinary range of the Trident D5 missile, mean that every day the USA and the UK project massive nuclear force into the Middle East – providing states such as Iran with an argument for acquiring their own nuclear weapons. The recent shifting of part of the US Trident fleet to the Pacific so that the major part is now based there is especially short-sighted. The relatively small number of Chinese land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles could be destroyed in a surprise attack, meaning that the new threat from Trident gives China a strong incentive to upgrade its nuclear arsenal.

• **Concealment, invulnerability and global reach:** once a Trident submarine leaves its base, its nuclear propulsion system enables it to travel submerged to any point in the world’s oceans and remain underwater for months. It can get within range of targets anywhere on earth while itself remaining undetected and invulnerable.

The net result of Trident’s exceptional capabilities was that its impact immediately exceeded its original anti-Soviet mission specification – making countries across the globe potential targets of a devastating first strike. Moreover, the addition of the UK Trident fleet to the US one has increased the Trident system’s globally destabilising effect. The UK has four Trident submarines, based at Faslane near Glasgow. The USA has 14 Trident submarines, of which five are based on the Atlantic coast at King’s Bay, Georgia, and the remaining nine on the Pacific at Bangor, Washington.

**Today Trident increases the danger of accidental nuclear war ...**

Even if the UK never intended to use Trident aggressively, its acquisition of a weapon with the capability to take part in a US-led first strike against the Soviet Union made nuclear war more likely. Through increasing the capacity of the USA and the UK to carry out such a strike, it added to the pressure on Soviet commanders who, whenever they received warning that a nuclear surprise attack might be under way, had only minutes to assess whether the alert was genuine or (as frequently happened) a false alarm, and decide whether to fire their missiles or face losing them. In a crisis and time of high alert, Russian and Chinese commanders would face the same dilemma today.

... and provides incentives for states across the globe to upgrade their nuclear arsenals (Russia and China) or to acquire the atomic bomb (Iran and North Korea)
'The W76 warhead is the backbone of America’s strategic deterrent. There are lots of these things out there. They are out there right now on submarines, submarines moving very quietly. We don’t know where they are. The bad guys don’t know where they are. Thirty minutes, however, and they can deliver this type of weapon to just about any target on earth. Okay? So the moral of the story is: don’t mess with the United States. You think Texas is bad? Try a Trident submarine.'

Dr Stephen Younger, Associate Director, Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory, 1999
WHY BRITAIN SHOULD STOP DEPLOYING TRIDENT

Acquiring Trident gave the UK a greater nuclear weapons capability than it could ever have achieved on its own. This enhanced capacity, however, had significant consequences.

The fact that, in theory, the British Prime Minister could give the order to fire Trident missiles without getting prior approval from the White House has allowed the UK to maintain the façade of being a global military power.

In practice, though, it is difficult to conceive of any situation in which a Prime Minister would fire Trident without prior US approval. The USA would see such an act as cutting across its self-declared prerogative as the world’s policeman, and would almost certainly make the UK pay a high price for its presumption. The fact that the UK is completely technically dependent on the USA for the maintenance of the Trident system, documented in John Ainslie’s report The Future of the British Bomb, means that one way the USA could show its displeasure would be to cut off the technical support needed for the UK to continue to send Trident to sea.

In practice, the only way that Britain is ever likely to use Trident is to give legitimacy to a US nuclear attack by participating in it. There are precedents for the USA using UK participation in this way for conventional military operations. The principal value of the UK’s participation in the recent Iraq war was to help legitimise the US attack. Likewise the principal value of the firing of UK cruise missiles as part of the larger US cruise missile attack on Baghdad was to help legitimise the use of such weapons against urban targets.

The most likely scenario in which Trident would actually be used is that Britain would give legitimacy to a US nuclear strike by participating in it. The well-established links between the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in Omaha, Nebraska, and the UK’s Permanent Joint Headquarters in Northwood, London would facilitate the planning of such attacks. In a crisis the very existence of the UK Trident system might make it difficult for a UK Prime Minister to refuse a request by the US President to participate in an attack.

THE UK’S TRIDENT SYSTEM IS NOT TRULY INDEPENDENT

Neither independent nor British nor a deterrent.
Harold Wilson

No one seriously imagined that the British bomb ... could ever be used without American assistance. ‘Targeting’ is a mutual enterprise. What is the target now? The defence establishment declines to provide an answer.
Roy Hattersley, former Deputy Leader of the Labour Party
The end of the Cold War made a nonsense of the UK Government’s official rationale for Trident – deterring a Soviet nuclear attack on UK territory. Since then Trident has been progressively remade so as to enhance its capacity to be used as an instrument of coercion against non-nuclear states – a process which has only added to its destabilising effect.

The problem facing US and British nuclear strategists is that they can only use their nuclear weapons as instruments of coercion if the state being coerced actually believes that they might use them. This is at present an incredible prospect in the UK, because the public is overwhelmingly opposed to the first use of nuclear weapons and to their use against non-nuclear states. In a September 2005 Greenpeace/MORI poll looking at British public opinion, 87% were against using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state, and 77% were against the first use of nuclear weapons.

Such actions would also be completely contrary to international law, which absolutely prohibits the use of nuclear weapons as instruments of coercion and the first use of a nuclear weapon against a non-nuclear state.

To overcome these barriers of illegality and popular opinion, proponents of the continued development of the US and UK nuclear arsenals have developed two tactics:

- **Presenting some non-nuclear states as constituting an imminent threat which can only be dealt with through the use of nuclear weapons.** The first step has been to try to convince the public that their very existence can be immediately threatened by distant non-nuclear states. This has been done by suggesting that ‘rogue’ states armed with chemical or biological weapons pose an immediate threat to the US and UK population and by arguing that we have ‘vital’ interests that are vulnerable to attack by such states, with catastrophic results.

- **Attempting the impossible task of making Trident a weapon which could be used against military or economic targets without the death of (many) civilians.** This has involved research and development to make Trident more accurate, the deployment of missiles with single warheads, and a contact fuse (which enables a smaller warhead to be used to destroy a hardened target). UK Government statements suggest the UK may already have adapted its Trident warhead to give a smaller explosion – effectively transforming Trident into a ‘mini’ nuclear weapon. This work has gone hand in hand with the development of targeting technologies which increase Trident’s ability to hit a wide range of targets across the globe as soon as their locations are known.

The following pages trace the emergence of these tactics for making Trident more usable against non-nuclear states.
WHY BRITAIN SHOULD STOP DEPLOYING TRIDENT

‘There is today no direct military threat to the United Kingdom or Western Europe. Nor do we foresee the re-emergence of such a threat... The Strategic Defence Review has conducted a rigorous re-examination of our deterrence requirements. This does not depend on the size of other nations’ arsenals but on the minimum necessary to deter any threat to our vital interests.’

The UK Strategic Defence Review 1998

Following the 1991 Gulf War we have seen the emergence of a transatlantic discourse which justifies the first use of UK, French and US nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. In 1991 a panel chaired by former US Air Force Secretary Thomas Reed argued that the USA should consider the development of a ‘nuclear expeditionary force’, armed with air- and submarine-launched nuclear weapons, to deal with the threat of chemical and biological attack and to defend its interests in the developing world.

Then in 1993 UK Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind used the same argument to explain why the UK was going ahead with the commissioning of its first Trident submarine, HMS Vanguard, in the absence of a Soviet threat. He proposed that Trident should be used to secure Britain’s ‘vital interests’ against the threat posed to them by rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction. The following year this became government policy.

After the 1997 general election the Labour Government quietly shelved the party’s traditional commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons. Then, in its 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the Government stated that there was no direct military threat to Western Europe and that it did not foresee the emergence of such a threat. Accordingly, it proposed that the UK’s armed forces should now be reoriented towards securing the country’s ‘vital interests’ – trade, investments, and access to resources (especially Middle Eastern oil). The size of the UK nuclear deterrent would now be ‘the minimum necessary to deter any threat to our vital interests’.

The same arguments have also provided a justification for the continued deployment of France’s submarine-based nuclear missiles, with President Jacques Chirac using a speech at the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale in 2001 to emphasise that France was prepared to use nuclear weapons to secure its ‘intérêts vitaux, en toutes circonstances et quelle que soit la localisation ou la nature des menaces’ (‘vital interests, in any circumstances, and whatever the location or nature of the threat’).

The idea that Trident should be used to secure the UK’s interests was reiterated in the 2002 New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review. The New Chapter took the further step of suggesting that the UK might use nuclear weapons pre-emptively ‘in the face of an imminent attack’; and in response to questioning by the Defence Select Committee on March 20 2002 about protecting British troops from attack by weapons of mass destruction, Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon told the House of Commons Defence Select Committee that states of concern should be ‘absolutely certain’ that in the right conditions Britain would be ‘willing to use its nuclear weapons’.

In its 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review, the Bush administration proposed that America might use nuclear weapons pre-emptively. Subsequent guidance issued by the White House in 2002 and 2003 created a new requirement for pre-emption, followed by a strike plan that operationalises the pre-emption doctrine. The leaked draft Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations presents Trident as being one of the tools that US commanders can use to carry out the new doctrine. It lists its advantages as being: ‘No risk to crew. Can be launched in international waters. Has a short flight time. Stealth and surprise can be achieved prior to launch. Flexible targeting capability.’

MAKING TRIDENT MORE USABLE – BREAKING DOWN PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO USE
The diagram below shows the W88 trident warhead. The British copy of the W76 warhead has the same basic components.

The full-scale hydrogen bomb explosion is created by, firstly, injecting tritium gas into the atomic bomb which will boost the size of the initial atomic explosion. Secondly, using a chemical explosion to compress the fissile material, starting an atomic reaction. And, thirdly, the resulting radiation then triggers a fusion reaction – resulting in a hydrogen bomb explosion many times more powerful than the initial atomic explosion.

Such warheads can be converted into a mini–nuclear weapon by replacing the hydrogen bomb part by a dummy, thereby eliminating the hydrogen bomb (fusion) part of the warhead and greatly diminishing the size of the explosion. The size of the atomic explosion can be further diminished by reducing the amount of tritium gas injected.

The UK Government has been deliberately ambiguous over whether Britain has already converted some Trident warheads into mini–nuclear weapons. On March 19th 1998 the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. George Robertson, in reply to a question by Ms. Roseanna Cunningham MP, stated that ‘The UK has some flexibility in the choice of yield for the warhead on its Trident missile.’

The 2000 Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Report suggests that such a warhead has actually been made: ‘With high accuracy, targeting and an option of two warhead yields, [Trident] can operate in both strategic and sub–strategic roles.’

To emphasise that altering the yield is not technically difficult, former US nuclear weapons design manager Bob Peurifoy, stated to the Oakland Tribune in a November 2003 interview ‘I know how to give you most of those yields today with a pair of wire cutters and a wrench.’
WHY BRITAIN SHOULD STOP DEPLOYING TRIDENT

The years since the end of the Cold War have seen major technical changes to the Trident system. These have been partly driven by the US nuclear weapons laboratories, whose current annual budget of $6 billion massively exceeds the Cold War average of $3.8 billion.

These changes are often justified by the need to maintain the safety of the stockpile, and also to ensure that, if used, the warheads would be less indiscriminate (they would destroy military and political targets while killing fewer civilians). The latter point represents an attempt to mollify public hostility to any first strike against a non-nuclear state.

The changes made also mean that the upgraded Trident can better fit the USA’s and UK’s new post-Cold War objectives: specifically, it can hit targets across the globe and be rapidly retargeted at mobile missiles and other shifting targets. The key changes to the UK Trident system are as follows:

• Extending the number of targets and rapid retargeting. The US Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Retargeting System (SRS) enables Trident submarines ‘to quickly, accurately and reliably retarget missiles to targets’, and allows ‘timely and reliable processing of an increased number of targets’. The system allows the USA rapidly to produce a nuclear attack plan using a small number of Trident warheads in a regional operation. The UK has purchased the fire control system at the core of SRS, and this has been installed in UK Trident submarines.

• Single-warhead missiles. In 1993 Malcolm Rifkind argued that a hostile leader might gamble that the UK would never use Trident to secure its vital interests because of the public outrage that would follow a full-scale Trident attack. He therefore recommended the development of a ‘sub-strategic’ Trident. This ‘sub-strategic’ mission was first deployed on HMS Victorious in December 1995 and involved fitting some missiles with only one warhead.

• Low-yield warheads. UK Trident may also have been made more ‘usable’ by reducing the yield of the warheads. In 1998 Defence Secretary George Robertson stated that ‘The UK has some flexibility in the choice of yield for the warhead on its Trident missile.’ This flexibility may be intended to help fulfil the sub-strategic mission. A lower yield can be achieved by detonating only the atomic bomb part of the weapon, making it an atomic fission weapon rather than a hydrogen fusion weapon (see diagram opposite).

MAKING TRIDENT MORE USABLE – TECHNICAL TRANSFORMATION

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THE RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD

On March 12 The Sunday Times revealed that UK and the US nuclear laboratories are racing to develop a new nuclear warhead. This warhead has been given the innocuously sounding name of the ‘Reliable Replacement Warhead.’ Statements by US nuclear weapons programmes head Linton Brooks and past practice strongly suggest, however, that the warhead incorporates elements of programmes now underway which take the transformation of Trident into a more ‘usable’ nuclear weapon further. Funding is on a massive scale. In 2005 the US Treasury allocated $1.7bn to develop the Trident D5 missile alone. Programmes underway include:

• Reducing the yield of the W76 warhead. There appears to be a current programme to reduce the size of the nuclear explosion produced by the US W76 warhead. According to a July 2005 report in the Santa Fe New Mexican newspaper, the W76 is being modified so as to reduce its yield by 40% to 60 kilotons.

• Improving the W76 warhead’s ability to destroy hardened targets. If Trident’s warhead could be made to explode close to the ground, then a low yield warhead could be used to destroy hardened targets such as missile silos. To achieve this the USA is seeking to give the W76 warhead a radar arming, firing and fusing mechanism similar to those fitted to the W88, which already has such a capability.

• Improving the D5 missile’s accuracy. If Trident were made more accurate, then a lower-yield warhead could be used to destroy a wide variety of targets. Recent years have seen a number of projects under way to give Trident ‘GPS-like accuracy’ (about 10m). The idea is to use GPS and/or inertial guidance to steer a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle to its target. Manoeuvrability will be achieved either by adding controllable flaps or a moveable inside weight to the re-entry vehicle.

These programmes are already becoming reality. The US Congress withdrew funding from the Navy’s programme to improve the D5 missile’s accuracy, but the Navy has been able to continue it using other funding, and in March 2005 the USS Tennessee carried out a test of a new re-entry vehicle with flaps and GPS guidance.
New targeting systems, including target planning, onshore targeting and onboard fire control systems, mean that Trident can be rapidly retargeted to hit mobile missiles, chemical and biological facilities, and command posts as soon as they are discovered anywhere on earth.

The idea that it may be legitimate to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states is established by magnifying the threat posed by ‘rogue’ states, talk of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ which makes chemical and biological weapons appear similar to nuclear weapons, and using the rhetoric of ‘vital interests.’

Single-warhead missile, reduced-yield warhead, increased accuracy and contact fuse – all add a surface plausibility to the idea that Trident could be used without many civilian casualties.

Trident’s global reach means that once at sea it threatens targets across the earth. From the North Atlantic, Trident can hit targets in Russia, China, India and the Middle East. Leaked Pentagon documents reveal plans to position Trident close to potential targets for surprise attack. The moving of some US Trident submarines to the Pacific increases the risk to China and other Asian states.

Close links between STRATCOM in Omaha, Nebraska, and the Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood in London would facilitate UK participation in a US nuclear attack, allowing the USA to counter accusations of unilateralism.

HOW TRIDENT IS BEING MADE MORE ‘USABLE’ – INCREASING GLOBAL INSTABILITY
A GLOBALLY DIVISIVE WEAPON WHICH THREATENS COOPERATION TO DEAL WITH GLOBAL PROBLEMS

To abolish double or multiple standards in the field of nuclear non-proliferation is the prerequisite for the success of nuclear non-proliferation. The purpose of nuclear non-proliferation should be the enhancement of the security of all states. The implementation of the NPT should be used as the sole criterion. Non-proliferation must not just serve the security interest of a small number of countries.

Trident undermines UK efforts to stop states such as Iran acquiring the bomb...

Trident’s continued development and deployment makes it difficult for the UK to argue that the world’s non-nuclear states should condemn Iran for developing a civil nuclear programme which will give it the capacity to build atomic weapons. When many countries see the USA and the UK pressing ahead with the development of a Trident system which may end up being targeted on them if they are perceived to be challenging the US vision for the future of their region – they may believe their interests lie more in supporting Iran than the USA and UK.

... is a threat to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty ...

The impasse at the 2005 NPT Review Conference was a critical indication of the crisis facing efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. At the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences the non-nuclear nations had made clear that their continued adherence to the Treaty depended on real action being taken by the declared nuclear weapon states to disarm their nuclear arsenals. They extracted from the nuclear weapon states clear commitments, which at the 2000 Review Conference were summarised in thirteen points.

However, when they arrived at the 2005 Review Conference they found not only that there had been a failure to accomplish any of the thirteen points, but that the USA was intent on pressing ahead with its nuclear weapons development and pre-emptive strike doctrines regardless of its previous commitments, and focusing its attention upon Iran. The conference broke up without any agreement, leaving the NPT weaker than at any time in its 35-year history.

... and its divisive effects may spill over into other areas of global cooperation

Trident is a threat to the de facto end to nuclear testing since 1998. At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the non nuclear states called for the declared nuclear weapon states to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty as part of their NPT commitment to disarmament. This led to the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. Although the continued upgrading of the Trident system does not violate the letter of the CTBT, it strikes directly at one of its central purposes: reducing the nuclear threat by stopping the upgrading of nuclear weapons systems.

There is no reason why Trident’s divisive effects should be restricted to the security arena. The same opposition to multi-lateralism which led US Republicans to sink the ratification of the CTBT led them to reject the Kyoto protocol on climate change. In such circumstances the USA and the UK’s continued upgrading and deployment of a Trident nuclear weapon which threatens all states may make the difference between achieving and not achieving the sense of common purpose needed to deal with global environmental problems such as climate change and the collapse of world fisheries.
We are witnessing continued efforts to strengthen and modernise nuclear arsenals. We also face a real threat that nuclear weapons will spread. Without concerted action, we may face a cascade of nuclear proliferation.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s message to the Peace Memorial Ceremony, Hiroshima, 6 August 2005

Those who rely on nuclear weapons to demonstrate and exercise power should recognise that such dependence on weapons of mass destruction only serves to increase insecurity rather than to promote security, peace and development.

Statement by South African Minister Abdul Minty to the 2005 NPT Review Conference

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Canonbury Villas
London
N1 2PN
www.greenpeace.org.uk

Greenpeace’s peace campaign is committed to eliminating all weapons of mass destruction and tackling the root causes of global insecurity. We champion nonviolence as a force for positive change in the world. We promote environmentally responsible and socially just development that is fair and secures broad participation. We advocate policies that ensure all peoples have access to the basic securities of life so that the injustices that lead to conflict cannot take hold.